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WILL IT MAKE MY JOB EASIER, OR  
WHAT’S IN IT FOR ME? 
Kenneth N. Flaxman* † 
Putting aside philosophical questions about public access to government 
proceedings—what we now call “transparency”—and without regard to 
whether televising Supreme Court arguments is a logical extension of the 
common law’s “absolute personal right of reasonable access to court files” 
as described in 1977 by the Seventh Circuit in Rush v. United States, my real 
concern about whether Supreme Court arguments should be televised is 
somewhat narcissistic. Will it make my job—as a plaintiff’s civil rights law-
yer who dabbles in criminal defense and post-conviction matters and who 
has had five adventures as “arguing counsel” in the Supreme Court—easier? 
I explain below why I think the answer is a resounding “yes.” 
In this age of YouTube, Media Matters, and low-cost desktop video edit-
ing, televised Supreme Court arguments will not follow the 1950s model of 
the Army-McCarthy hearings, which the Museum of Broadcast Communi-
cations described as “the first nationally televised congressional inquiry and 
a landmark in the emergent nexus between television and American poli-
tics.” In addition to the inevitable C-SPAN-style sterile coverage starting 
with counsel’s opening words of “May it please the Court” and ending with 
the Chief Justice’s concluding statement of “The case is submitted,” expect 
to see on your favorite video blog or fake news program short video bites 
that capture the essence of a case—or more likely, in my view, excerpts that 
make someone (most likely a judge) look and sound like an ignorant or 
prejudiced bumpkin. (This is not criticism of the Court or of any of its past 
or present members, only a reflection on the reality of sound bite and video 
snippet journalism.)  
Based on my experience arguing more than two hundred appeals, in-
cluding five in the Supreme Court, my guess is that this type of exposure 
would be a good thing and would make my job easier. A lawyer’s job in a 
case before the Supreme Court is different than in a case before a trial judge 
or an intermediate appellate court. Rather than trying to convince a judge (or 
a panel of judges) why a particular outcome is compelled by precedent, an 
attorney presenting a case before the Supreme Court has an opportunity to 
urge the Court to change the law—as it did in the case I argued just this 
year, Wallace v. Kato—and reject the construction that every Court of  
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Appeals had afforded to an earlier Supreme Court case, meanwhile an-
nouncing a new rule. (The Court can make new law without any request 
from the parties, as it did on this issue in Wallace.) Oral argument before the 
Supreme Court need not focus on whether prior decisions require a particu-
lar result, but rather on the “big picture” justifications for a particular result. 
Another salient factor for a lawyer with a case before the Supreme Court 
is that the Court controls the size of its docket and, at least in the number of 
cases it decides on the merits, is not a victim of litigation explosion. This 
means the Supreme Court, unlike the lower federal courts, is not compelled 
by its workload to decide cases without oral argument, or with oral argu-
ment limited to “ten minutes per side” as is common in at least one federal 
court of appeals. 
Oral argument before the Supreme Court is always at least thirty min-
utes per side. While this may seem long, arguments in the Court’s early days 
could extend over several days while Justices ate and sometimes slept, as 
explained by Stephen M. Shapiro in Oral Argument in the Supreme Court: 
The Felt Necessities of the Time. The first formal limitation on oral argument 
came in 1849, when each side was limited to a mere two hours. The time 
was reduced to one hour per side in 1925 and then reduced again to its pre-
sent thirty minutes per side in 1970.  
Although ten minutes of oral argument before a trial judge or an inter-
mediate appellate court may be required before the court will understand a 
party’s position, this should not be true in the Supreme Court, where the 
written submissions are more thorough, more carefully researched, and bet-
ter written than briefs filed in lower courts.  In my perhaps jaundiced view, 
the Supreme Court should not need to hear oral argument to understand the 
positions of the parties. 
Other than tradition or public spectacle, is there a reason why the Su-
preme Court continues to hear oral arguments? I believe that oral argument 
before the Supreme Court is the prequel to the decision conference. Argu-
ments before a Court comprised of Justices with widely disparate views may 
very well frame the debate that will presumably take place during the post-
argument conference.  
Televising arguments should make it easier for arguing counsel to frame 
the post-argument debate by encouraging better judicial behavior. A Justice 
who is successful at provoking laughter in the courtroom may find that his or 
her humor falls flat in a video snippet. Similarly, a Justice who declines to ask 
questions of counsel at oral argument, but who engages in whispered conver-
sations with other justices, might change his or her behavior in light of its 
exposure on YouTube. Likewise, a Justice who makes a truly stupid comment 
may find that life tenure does not provide immunity from public ignominy. 
And a Justice who is well past his or her prime and no longer in touch with 
reality (and no, I’m not suggesting this is the case with any member of the 
Court) would have greater difficulty hiding his or her disability. 
I expect that televising arguments, like the recent amendment to Rule 
32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure authorizing the citation of 
unpublished opinions, would enhance the integrity of the decisional process. 
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Unpublished opinions—which, of course, are actually published on Westlaw 
and LexisNexis—permit a court to reach a result that it could not justify in 
an opinion that would be precedential. I was exposed to this almost twenty 
years ago in Browder v. Director, Illinois Department of Corrections, where 
the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s judgment. In an unpub-
lished opinion, the appellate court had committed the unspeakable sin of 
stating that it need not resolve the challenge to its appellate jurisdiction. In 
resolving Browder, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue whether the 
rules authorizing unpublished opinions exceeded the rulemaking authority 
of the courts of appeals, leaving the question for “another day.” That day 
arrived more than twenty years later when the Supreme Court adopted the 
amended Rule 32.1. 
In sum, sunlight may or may not be the “best disinfectant,” and I am not 
suggesting that Supreme Court proceedings are infested with bacteria or 
germs. Moreover, I do not want to see TV cameras roll over the dead body 
of any Supreme Court Justice. But television coverage would significantly 
increase the utility of oral arguments at the Supreme Court. Justice Souter’s 
hyperbolic bon mot notwithstanding, I anxiously await video podcasts of 
Supreme Court arguments.   
